----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- 
 
Alan Freeman wrote: 
 
>I mentioned the 'analytic' foundation of the distinction, but this didn't 
>seem to get picked up. I don't think 'analytic' is the same as 'absolute' 
 
>I want to know if there is some other basis for the distinction than 
>personal whim. I can't see, for example, that the reason one treats water 
>as part of a river, and an aeroplane above it as outside the river, is 
>reducible to rhetoric. I think it has something to do with objectivity; 
>pace postmodernism, I feel it arises from any reasonable way of 
>conceiving what a river or an aeroplane actually is. 
 
May I go back to Keynes (sorry for not referring directly to the market  
problem)? The passage from the GT I cited a couple of days ago,  
where JMK claimed that what is considered as given, what id a  
determinant and what is to determined depends on the problem at hand,  
cannot be reduced to a 'personal whim'.  There is an important problem  
in the theory of knowledge behind this -which turns out to be important  
for history of thought, too.   
 
One must remember that the theorist is, in a way, part of the theory, in  
the sense that he or she chooses the analytical tools, categories,  
language etc. in terms of which he or she frames the relevant questions.  
And when the question is framed in a certain language, if there is an  
answer, this comes by means of the same language. Example: if I try to  
frame a theory of the trade cycle by means of linear functional  
equations, I must not be surprised if the response of my system is very  
mechanistic and gives rise to "a changeless change in a timeless time"  
(Koyre, Newtonian Studies). Objectivity is simply a myth: facts do not  
exist by themselves, they exist only so far as we have some theory  
which enables us to recognize them as such -i.e., to interpret them.   
 
This, however, is not to say that one can do whatever one wants with  
theories and models: the real world often refuses to be pigeon-holed in  
certain boxes, and to be represente in terms of certain kinds of  
languages etc.   
 
There is thus a double bind between the world, its representation, and  
the theorist: the theorist, by choosing the theoretical terms, affects the  
representation of the world. But not all representations fit the world.   
 
How does one know? Well, this is where the difference between a  
good theorist and a bad modeller lies: "The specialist in the  
manufacture of models will not be successful unless he is constantly  
correcting his judgement by intimate and messy acquaintance with the  
facts to which his model has to be applied" (JMK to Harrod, 16 July  
1938, in CW XIV p. 300). Keynes's conclusion is, I think, relevant on  
this -and matches the quote in my previous posting:   
 
        "Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to  
the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary  
world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural  
science, the material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not  
homogeneous through time. The object of a model is to segregate the  
semi-permanent or relatively constant factors from those which are  
transitory or fluctuating so as to develop a logical way of thinking  
about the latter, and of understanding the time sequences to which they  
give rise in particular cases.  Good economists are scarce because the  
gift for using 'vigilant observation' to choose good models, although it  
does not require a highly specialised intellectual technique, appears to  
be a very rare one." (ibid., pp. 296-7)   
 
Daniele Besomi 
 
------------ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ------------ 
For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]