Thank you, all, for the wonderful suggestions. Just in case there's someone else interested in and
benefiting
from them as well, I guess it's worth putting forward Maurice Lagueux's The forgotten role of the rationality principle in economics (2004). Journal of Economic Methodology , 11(1), 31-55.
Samuel, yes, although not just time but also context. Yet, I am not sure that the problem with indifference has to do with time-independence or that it makes sense even in the present. What's debatable is not so much that it suggests people make choices as (neoclassical) economists think they should but that it suggests they evaluate choices in this way. For indifference suggests that - even if taken just in the present - two distinct options are deemed of equal let's say value in the most general sense. A bottle of water and eight packs of chips might for an economist be only quantitatively different from three bottles and five packs (the closest the theory coming to a qualitative evaluation probably being the diminishing rate of MU). Hence, he is able to equate them. But is it so for the everyday decision maker (be it an economist or not) who would probably be more inclined to view them as qualitatively different and hence non-equalisable?
M. U.
-------- Оригинално писмо --------
От: Samuel Bostaph
Относно: Re: [SHOE] Preference axioms
До: [log in to unmask]
Изпратено на: Понеделник, 2013, Януари 21 03:04:23 EET
If one assumes that decisions take place out of time, then neoclassical utility theory makes sense, doesn't it? But, decisions of actual human beings take place in real time and indifference is one of those things that only make sense in the present--an infinite slice of time. I agree that indifference is not indecisiveness. Indecisiveness can be timeless; indifference--being a type of decision--cannot.
Samuel Bostaph, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus of Economics
University of Dallas
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing happened."--Winston Churchill
--- On Sun, 1/20/13, Марина Узунова wrote:
From: Марина Узунова
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Preference axioms
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Sunday, January 20, 2013, 2:17 PM
Yes, Rothbard's fallacy of indifference is very astutely and elegantly put forward. But it has always seemed to me, isn't the fallacy - and the poor Buriden's ass misfortunate fate - due to a mixing of the notions of indifference and indecisiveness? The two being distinct states. After all, indifference has a very precise meaning in utility theory and it's not equivalent to the lack of ability to decide which option to take.
M.U.
-------- Оригинално писмо --------
От: Samuel Bostaph
Относно: Re: [SHOE] Preference axioms
До: [log in to unmask]
Изпратено на: Събота, 2013, Януари 19 15:01:28 EET
Also worth reading on this topic is Murray Rothbard's "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics." It is refreshingly critical of the concept of revealed
preference. Although included in several edited collections over the years, it can easily be googled.
Samuel Bostaph, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus of Economics
University of Dallas
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing happened."--Winston Churchill
--- On Fri, 1/18/13, Марина Узунова wrote:
From: Марина Узунова
Subject: [SHOE] Preference axioms
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Friday, January 18, 2013, 8:51 AM
Greetings all,
Can someone recommend studies - theoretical papers, experiments, books, lectures - on the axioms of (revealed) preference theory? My interest in particular lies in any explorations of "completeness" and "indifference" although I'd be happy if someone can think of works similar in their breadth to that of Sen's "Behaviour and the concept of preference". Philosophical, historical, theoretical and experimental suggestions are all welcome alike.
Thanks in advance and best wishes,
Marina Uzunova
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