Yes, Rothbard's fallacy of indifference is very astutely and elegantly put forward. But it has always seemed to me, isn't the fallacy - and the poor Buriden's ass misfortunate fate - due to a mixing of the notions of indifference and indecisiveness? The two being distinct states. After all, indifference has a very precise meaning in utility theory and it's not equivalent to the lack of ability to decide which option to take.
 M.U.




-------- Оригинално писмо --------
От:  Samuel Bostaph  
Относно: Re: [SHOE] Preference axioms
До: [log in to unmask]
Изпратено на: Събота, 2013, Януари 19 15:01:28 EET


    Also worth reading on this topic is Murray Rothbard's "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics." It is refreshingly critical of the concept of revealed preference. Although included in several edited collections over the years, it can easily be googled. 

Samuel Bostaph, Ph.D.

Professor Emeritus of Economics

University of Dallas



"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing happened."--Winston Churchill

--- On  Fri, 1/18/13, Марина Узунова      wrote:
 
From: Марина Узунова  
Subject: [SHOE] Preference axioms
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Friday, January 18, 2013, 8:51 AM

  
 
Greetings all, 
  Can someone recommend studies - theoretical papers, experiments, books, lectures - on the axioms of (revealed) preference theory? My interest in particular lies in any explorations of "completeness" and "indifference" although I'd be happy if someone can think of works similar in their breadth to that of Sen's "Behaviour and the concept of preference". Philosophical, historical, theoretical and experimental suggestions are all welcome alike.
  
  Thanks in advance and best wishes,  
  Marina Uzunova